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Alberto Rabbachin, Member, IEEE, Andrea Conti, Senior Member, IEEE, and Moe Z. Win, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Wireless secrecy is essential for communication con-
fidentiality, health privacy, public safety, information superiority,
and economic advantage in the modern information society. Con-
temporary security systems are based on cryptographic primitives
and can be complemented by techniques that exploit the intrinsic
properties of a wireless environment. This paper develops a foun-
dation for design and analysis of wireless networks with secrecy
provided by intrinsic properties such as node spatial distribution,
wireless propagation medium, and aggregate network interfer-
ence. We further propose strategies that mitigate eavesdropping
capabilities, and we quantify their benefits in terms of network
secrecy metrics. This research provides insights into the essence of
wireless network intrinsic secrecy and offers a new perspective on
the role of network interference in communication confidentiality.
Index Terms—Network secrecy, wireless networks, stochastic
geometry, interference exploitation, fading channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
I NFORMATION society largely benefits from the ability totransfer confidential information, to guarantee privacy, and
to authenticate users in communication networks. Contempo-
rary security systems are based on cryptographic primitives that
rely on the computational intractability of solving certain nu-
meric-theoretic problems [1]. Security in wireless systems is
challenging due to the broadcast nature of the channel, which
facilitates the interception of radio communications. Wireless
security schemes have typically evolved from those developed
for traditional wireline applications [2], [3]; these schemes do
not consider physical properties of the wireless channels.
The idea of exploiting physical properties of the environment
for providing communication confidentiality dates back several
centuries. For example, the Hall Pompeiana of Massimo The-
ater, shown in Fig. 1, was designed to make conversations in
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Fig. 1. Hall Pompeiana of Massimo Theater at Palermo (Foto Studio Camera
Palermo).
the proximity of its center indecipherable in any other parts of
the hall. This was achieved by creating intentional echoes gen-
erated by the shape of the hall, thus giving credence to the idea
that interference can be exploited to provide confidentiality.
The concept of communication secrecy is built on the infor-
mation-theoretic notion of perfect secrecy [4]. Based on this
concept, the wire-tap channel is introduced in [5] to investigate
scenarios in which the eavesdropper attempts to intercept the in-
formation by tapping the legitimate link in the presence of noisy
observations. As shown for a discrete memoryless wire-tap
channel [5] and for a Gaussian wire-tap channel [6], the secrecy
capacity depends on the difference between the capacity of the
legitimate link and that of the eavesdropping link.1 In wireless
environments, the propagation medium plays an important role
in communication confidentiality; specifically, the secrecy ca-
pacity in fading channels is investigated in [11]–[13]. Secrecy
capacity has been further studied in the context of multiple-ac-
cess channels [14]–[16], broadcast channels [17]–[19], artificial
noise [20], eavesdropper collusion [21]–[23], point-to-point
diversity communications [24]–[27], and cooperative commu-
nications [28]. The generation of secret keys at the physical
layer using common sources, such as reciprocal wireless chan-
nels, is addressed in [29]–[33].
In a network setting, spatial distribution of nodes plays an
important role, and the Poisson point process (PPP) is used
to investigate wireless networks with secrecy [34]–[39].2
We advocate the exploitation of wireless network intrinsic
properties (e.g., network interference) to strengthen communi-
cation secrecy. While interference is conventionally considered
deleterious for communications [58]–[60], we envision that
interference can be beneficial for network secrecy [61]–[63].
Therefore, it is important to characterize the effects of network
1For a discrete memoryless channel, polar codes have been shown to achieve
strong secrecy [7]–[10].
2The PPP [40] has been used extensively to model node positions in various
studies of wireless networks [41]–[57].
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interference at both legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers.
From this, competitive strategies can be devised for elevating
the secrecy of the network to a new level.
In this paper, we establish foundations for the design and
analysis of wireless networks with intrinsic secrecy. In partic-
ular, we develop a framework accounting for: 1) the spatial dis-
tributions of legitimate, eavesdropping, and interfering nodes;
2) the physical properties of the wireless propagation medium;
and 3) the characteristics of aggregate network interference. Our
approach is based on stochastic geometry, probability theory,
and communication theory. The key contributions of the paper
can be summarized as follows:
• introduction of the concept of network secrecy and new
metrics for characterizing intrinsic wireless secrecy in sce-
narios composed by legitimate, eavesdropping, and inter-
fering nodes;
• development of a framework for design and analysis of
wireless networks with intrinsic secrecy that accounts for
node spatial distribution, physical propagation medium,
and aggregate network interference;
• characterization of the received signal-to-interference ra-
tios (SIRs) in legitimate and eavesdropping networks for
different destination selection techniques;
• quantification of the network secrecy performance pro-
vided by legitimate network strategies that mitigate the ca-
pabilities of the eavesdropping network.
This research shows that the intrinsic properties of wireless net-
works can provide a new level of secrecy, paving the way to the
design of wireless networks with enhanced intrinsic secrecy.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II
presents the scenarios for legitimate, eavesdropping, and inter-
fering networks. Section III introduces metrics for assessing
wireless network secrecy. Sections IV and V provide the sta-
tistical characterization of SIRs for different fading channels.
In Section VI, competitive strategies for enhancing network se-
crecy are proposed and analyzed. Numerical results and final
remarks are provided in Sections VII and VIII, respectively.
II. NETWORK SCENARIOS
We now present the scenarios for legitimate, eavesdropping,
and interfering networks. We first introduce the network sce-
narios and then present the wireless-tap channel within the con-
sidered network setting.
A. Network Secrecy Scenarios
Consider three different overlaid networks as described in the
following (see Fig. 2).
1) The legitimate network is composed of nodes that aim
to exchange confidential information. This network is de-
scribed by the point process with spatial density .3
is composed of point processes and with spatial
densities and corresponding to the legitimate trans-
mitters and the legitimate receivers, respectively. Thus,
and
(1)
3Spatial densities are measured in nodes per unit volume (UV). For a two-
dimensional plane, spatial densities are given in node/m .
Fig. 2. Network scenario considered in the paper.
is defined such that and with
.
2) The eavesdropping network is composed of nodes that
attempt to intercept the confidential information flowing
through the legitimate network. This network is described
by the point process with spatial density .
3) The interfering network is composed of nodes that interfere
with both legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Each
legitimate receiver experiences the unintentional interfer-
ence generated by the legitimate transmitters that intend
to communicate with other receivers. On the other hand,
each eavesdropper is affected by unintentional and inten-
tional interference generated by the legitimate transmitters
and the intentional interferers, respectively.4 The network
of intentional interferers is described by the point process
with spatial density . The quantities and
represent the total spatial density of nodes
interfering the legitimate network and the eavesdropping
network, respectively.
Legitimate transmitters, legitimate receivers, eavesdroppers,
and intentional interferers are spatially scattered in an -dimen-
sional Euclidian space according to the homogeneous spatial
PPPs , , , and , respectively. Let and denote
the index sets of legitimate transmitters and of intentional inter-
ferers, respectively. Consider a bounded set . For the
th legitimate transmitter in :5
• denotes the index set of potential legitimate receivers
for the th transmitter, and
4Networks of intentional interferers are especially effective if they have the
knowledge of legitimate receivers’ positions (see for example, Section VI).
5Hereafter, the th node refers to the node with index in the network.
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• denotes the index set of eavesdroppers attempting to
intercept the confidential information from the th trans-
mitter.
Note, the probability that there are no transmitters in is
where is the volume of .
B. Wireless-Tap Channel in Network Setting
Based on the network scenarios described in Section II-A,
we introduce the wireless-tap channel composed of a legiti-
mate transmitter with index , a legitimate receiver with index
(i.e., the th potential legitimate receiver among
those of the th transmitter), and an eavesdropper with index
(i.e., the th eavesdropper among those of the th
transmitter) attempting to intercept the transmission of confi-
dential information. A key feature of the wireless-tap channel
in a network setting is the network interference, which will be
described in the following.
At a given instant, the received signal at a node with index
from the th transmitter is given by
(2)
where, for the th legitimate transmitter
for
for (3)
with or denoting the legitimate link or eavesdropping link,
respectively. In (2), is the signal power at the reference dis-
tance from the transmitter; is the quasi-static
channel gain; is the normalized Eu-
clidian distance between the transmitter and the receiver at the
random positions and , respectively; is a transmitted
symbol; is the amplitude path-loss exponent; and is the
disturbance composed of the network interference and the re-
ceiver noise. Specifically
(4)
where is the index set of nodes causing interference to the
receiver , i.e.,
for
for (5)
in which is the addictive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN).6
The variation of distances and channel gains
affects the behavior of . Therefore, is introduced to
denote the set of and channel gains from transmitters
to receivers. In particular, is equal to or
depending on whether is a legitimate receiver or an eaves-
dropper, respectively. To maximize the mutual information over
legitimate links and to maximize the entropy over interfering
links, all transmitters employ signaling schemes such that the
6The notation denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
distribution with mean and variance per dimension.
resulting disturbance conditioned on the PPP is complex
Gaussian [64]–[67]
(6)
where is the variance of a transmitted complex symbol
and is the normalized network interference power given by
(7)
Note that since in (7) depends on , it can be seen as a
random variable taking different values for each realization of
the . In particular, for nodes in , the randon variable (RV)
follows a Stable distribution [41], [42], [48]7
(8)
where
for
for (9a)
(9b)
.
(9c)
III. NETWORK SECRECY METRICS
We now introduce new metrics for assessing intrinsic secrecy
in wireless networks.
A. Maximum Secrecy Rate of a Wireless-Tap Channel
We first review the maximum secrecy rate (MSR) of a
Gaussian wire-tap channel [6]. We then extend it to scenarios
with network interference.8
1) Absence of Network Interference: Conditioned on
and with , the wireless-tap channel
reduces to the Gaussian wire-tap channel. Specifically, the con-
ditional MSR in the absence of interference is given by9
(10)
The term
(11)
is the conditional capacity10 of the legitimate link or
eavesdropping link in the absence of network interfer-
ence with
(12)
7In a space with more than two dimensions, the RV still follows a skewed
stable distribution with different parameters [68].
8Hereafter, consider a network scenario composed of multiple legitimate and
eavesdropping links with receivers that treat interference as noise.
9 , and the unit of the MSR is confidential information bits
(cib) per second per Hertz (cib/s/Hz).
10For notational convenience, define bits/s/Hz.
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2) Presence of Network Interference: Conditioned on
and with , the MSR in the pres-
ence of interference is given by
(13)
The term
(14)
is the conditional capacity11 of the legitimate link or
eavesdropping link in the presence of network inter-
ference, where
(15)
TheMSR of the legitimate link from the th transmitter to the
th receiver, conditioned on and , is deter-
mined by the minimumMSR over all possible eavesdroppers in
the network attempting to intercept the confidential information
as
(16)
where with .
B. Network Secrecy Rate Density
To characterize the successful transmission of confidential in-
formation originated from legitimate nodes in a bounded set ,
define the conditional network secrecy rate as
(17)
where with
(18a)
(18b)
In (17), accounts for the legitimate transmitters in
according to
if
otherwise
and is the index of the selected receiver for the
th transmitter.12 The network secrecy rate density is defined as
the limit over and can be expressed as
(19)
11Conditioned on , the instantaneous amplitude of the aggregate inter-
ference is Gaussian distributed [64]–[67], and the capacity of the legitimate and
eavesdropping links is expressed using .
12The network secrecy depends on the destination selection strategy that will
be described in Sections IV and V. The is the selection operator that
selects the index of the destination among the potential receiver indexes for
the th transmitter. For brevity, in the notation of the MSR, its dependence on
will be omitted.
where is a convex averaging sequence with
. It is demonstrated in Appendix A that if
as , then13
(20)
where is the average MSR of a typical
link in the network [69] and over the channel gains.14 15 When
and are statistically independent, the average MSR
can be written as
(21)
where and are the probability density func-
tion (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the RV , respectively.
Remark: The PDF of , and thus the average MSR of
a typical link, depends on the destination selection strategy.
C. Network Secrecy Rate Outage Density
Now, define a network secrecy metric to account for the le-
gitimate links that are in outage, i.e., the legitimate links with
MSR below a target MSR. Specifically, for a given target MSR
and for transmitters in , the number of legitimate links in
outage is
(22)
Following the approach used in Section III-B, the density of
transmitting nodes that are in outage is obtained as
(23)
The density of transmitting nodes in outage (23) results in
(24)
where is the probability that a legitimate link is in
outage given by
(25)
Remark: To achieve the MSR, the transmitter has to know
the signal-to-interfernce-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) at the
selected receiver and that at each eavesdropper. The latter
requirement is challenging to devise techniques for achieving
the MSR. Therefore, in Section III-D, the concept of network
13 denotes a ball in with radius .
14The expectation is over the point processes for which the legitimate
transmitter is located in the origin.
15We consider a typical link of the network with transmitter index .
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secrecy throughput is introduced to characterize the confiden-
tial information flowing through the legitimate network.
D. Probability to Transmit Information With Secrecy
We first generalize the secrecy outrage probability (SOP) of
[13] to account for the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and
multiple interferers as16
(26)
where is the transmission rate of a legitimate link associ-
ated with the th transmitter, is the desired rate of confiden-
tial information, and indicates the event that a confidential
information message is transmitted.17 When a confidential mes-
sage is not transmitted, various strategies can be employed for
mitigating the capabilities of the eavesdropping network. In par-
ticular, we propose to transmit no-information messages over
low-quality links to increase network interference. In this set-
ting, the th legitimate transmitter sends a no-information mes-
sage when for a selected receiver is below a minimum
required value ; otherwise, a confidential information message
is transmitted. Therefore, the probability of confidential mes-
sage transmission is
(27)
The minimum required SINR value of is related to the secrecy
rate according to . Note also from (26) that
the network secrecy outage is reduced by increasing . Since
for any , the SOP results in
(28)
For a given secrecy rate and a maximum tolerable SOP ,
we define the secrecy protection ratio as
(29)
where .
16The outage probability is a metric largely used in wireless communication
systems requiring inverse performance expressions (see, e.g., [70]–[75]). Sim-
ilarity with network secrecy is in evaluating the probability that the desired se-
crecy rate is not achieved when confidential information is transmitted.
17The transmission of a confidential message can be based on the SINR at the
intended receiver.
E. Network Secrecy Throughput Density
For a given and , the secrecy throughput of the legit-
imate link associated with the th transmitter, conditioned on
, is given by
(30)
Similar to the conditional network secrecy rate defined in
Section III-B, the conditional network secrecy throughput
originated from the legitimate nodes in a bounded set is
defined as
(31)
Then, the network secrecy throughput density is given by
(32)
which results in
(33)
In (33), is the average secrecy throughput
of a typical link in the network with the legitimate transmitter
placed in the origin. Specifically, we can write18
(34)
The evaluation of network secrecy metrics, given by (20),
(24), and (33), requires the statistical characterization of
and , whose CDF and PDF are derived in the following.
IV. STATISTICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF SIRS IN GENERIC
FADING CHANNELS
Various strategies for selecting destinations can be employed
to establish the legitimate links in wireless networks. Specif-
ically, we consider the destination selection strategies where
confidential information is sent to: 1) the th closest receiver,
or 2) the receiver with the maximum SIR. We consider inter-
ference limited conditions and characterize the SIRs at the th
legitimate receiver and at the th eavesdropper, which are re-
spectively given by
(35)
and
(36)
A. SIRs in the Legitimate Network
We now characterize the SIR at a legitimate receiver selected
from using different selection strategies.
1) th Closest Legitimate Receiver: Consider all legitimate
receivers of the network with index set . To characterize
the SIR at the receiver selected based on distances from the
18Note that the network secrecy throughput density in (33) has a double de-
pendency on both and since also depends on the density of trans-
mitters and the secrecy rate.
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transmitter, consider the ordered index set of legitimate re-
ceivers where the ordering is based on distances, i.e.,
. The CDF is given by
(37)
(38)
where . Using the
inversion theorem [76]
(39)
where19
(40)
and is the characteristic function CF of the RV .20 In
Appendix B, the CF is derived as
(41)
Equation (39), together with (40) and (41), gives the CDF of
.
Remark: The CF (41) and therefore the CDF (39) depend
on the ratio between densities of legitimate transmitters and re-
ceivers .
2) Maximum SIR Legitimate Receiver: Consider all legiti-
mate receivers, with index set , in a bounded set . The
CDF of can be expressed as (see
derivation in Appendix C)
(42)
where
(43)
with defined in (40). The CF is given by (68)
and (69), except that is replaced by .
For a two-dimensional circular region centered at the
legitimate transmitter with radius , and
the squared distances for various ’s are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with uniform distribution in
.21 Therefore, the CF of becomes
(44)
19Note that the right side of (39) is written explicitly as a function of to
emphasize the dependence of on .
20The notation indicates the real part of its argument, , and
.
21Note that the CDF expression derived for a finite area will be useful in
Section VI when competitive strategies for network secrecy will be proposed
and analyzed.
B. SIR in the Eavesdropping Network
Consider all the eavesdroppers, with index , in a bounded
set . Recall that the eavesdropper with the maximum SIR
determines the secrecy performance. The CDF of can
be obtained following similar derivation as in Section IV-A.2 as
(45)
Using the fact that is a Stable RV according to (8), we
obtain the CF as in (68) and (69), except that the
parameters of the legitimate receivers are replaced by those of
the eavesdroppers.
For a two-dimensional circular region centered at the le-
gitimate transmitter with radius , the CDF is given
by (43)–(45), except: is replaced by in (43), and ,
, and are replaced by , , and in (44).
For some fading distributions, the CDF of the SIR for both le-
gitimate and eavesdropping networks can be obtained in closed
form. Specifically, Section V provides closed-form expressions
for Nakagami- fading channels.
V. STATISTICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF SIRS IN NAKAGAMI
FADING CHANNELS
Based on the results obtained in Section IV, we now char-
acterize the SIR at the selected legitimate receivers and at the
eavesdroppers in Nakagami- fading channels.22
A. SIRs in the Legitimate Network
1) th Closest Legitimate Receiver: The CDF of the SIR
at the legitimate receiver selected based on distances from the
transmitter can be derived using the chain rule of conditional
expectation as
(46)
where
(47)
In Appendix D, the CDF for Nakagami- fading
channels is derived as
(48)
Finally, by differentiating (48) with respect to , we obtain the
PDF of as
(49)
22Integer values for fading severity are considered.
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2) Maximum SIR Legitimate Receiver: The CDF of the SIR
at the legitimate receiver, selected based on the maximum SIR,
is given by (42) in terms of . The CDF of of
can be written as
(50)
where the conditional CDF for Nak-
agami- fading channels is given by (72), except that
is replaced by . To carry out the expectation in (50), we
consider a two-dimensional circular region centered at the
legitimate transmitter with radius . The expectation over
results in
(51)
for , and 0 otherwise, where
(52)
Substituting (51) into (42), the CDF for the maximum SIR
is obtained. To complete the derivation, we take the
limit as , resulting in
(53)
Differentiating (53) with respect to yields the PDF of the max-
imum SIR for the legitimate receivers. Note that the distribution
of the maximum SIR depends on the ratio .
B. SIR in the Eavesdropping Network
By following the approach in Section IV-B for the case of
general fading and using the derivations in Section V-A.2,
the CDF of can be expressed as in (45) where, for Nak-
agami- fading, is given by
(54)
for and 0 otherwise. Letting , we obtain the
CDF of given by (53) except , , and are re-
placed by , , and , respectively. Note that the distri-
bution of the maximum SIR depends on the ratio .
VI. COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK SECRECY
As observed in Sections IV and V, intrinsic properties,
such as aggregate network interference and nodes spatial dis-
tribution, affect network secrecy. Therefore, both legitimate
and eavesdropping nodes can employ competitive strategies
exploiting these intrinsic properties for preserving or disrupting
information confidentiality, respectively. In particular, we
propose and analyze competitive strategies for: 1) neutralizing
eavesdropping capabilities; 2) reducing network interference
at the legitimate receiver; 3) reducing network interference at
the eavesdroppers; and 4) controlling the network interference
injected into the legitimate and the eavesdropping networks.23
These strategies are presented for networks in a two-dimen-
sional plane.
A. Nearby Eavesdropping Region Neutralization
The nearby eavesdropping region neutralization (NERN)
strategy aims to deny capabilities of eavesdroppers around the
legitimate transmitter. This strategy is based on the observation
that eavesdroppers close to the transmitter are likely to have
high SIR; therefore, they are primary culprits for reducing
the level of network secrecy. Specifically, when NERN is
employed, all eavesdroppers within a distance from the
transmitter are neutralized.24 In this case, the squared distances
of the remaining eavesdroppers are i.i.d. and follow
a uniform distribution in . Therefore, the CDF of
becomes
(55)
Letting , the CDF of the maximum SIR becomes
(56)
Using (56) together with the results in Section V, the network
secrecy rate density (20), the network secrecy rate outage den-
sity (24), and the network secrecy throughput density (33) are
obtained for the case of NERN strategy.
B. Eavesdropping Network Interference Suppression
The eavesdropping network interference suppression (ENIS)
strategy aims to reduce the effects of network interference on
the eavesdroppers. This strategy is based on the observation
that the eavesdroppers with higher SIR have better capabilities
for eavesdropping the confidential information. Specifically,
when ENIS is employed, the network interference at each
eavesdropper can be reduced, for example, by narrowing the
angle from which radio signals are received via beamforming.
Consider the ENIS strategy where eavesdroppers employ an-
tennas with aperture angle radians, in which case the effective
density of interferers affecting the eavesdroppers is
(57)
23For brevity, the performance of these strategies is analyzed in the case of
Nakagami- fading channel. However, the analysis can be carried out for other
fading distributions using the results of Section IV.
24Consider that eavesdroppers within the neutralization region of transmitter
are still capable of eavesdropping other transmitters.
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Such strategy also affects the density of the eavesdroppers ca-
pable of intercepting the confidential information, whose effec-
tive density is given by
(58a)
or
(58b)
depending on whether the eavesdroppers have or do not have
the knowledge of legitimate transmitter positions.25
Replacing and with and , and using the results
in Section V, the network secrecy rate density (20), the net-
work secrecy rate outage density (24), and the network secrecy
throughput density (33) are obtained for the ENIS strategy.
C. Legitimate Network Interference Suppression
The legitimate network interference suppression (LNIS)
strategy aims to reduce the effects of network interference on
the legitimate receivers. This strategy is based on the observa-
tion that the legitimate receivers with higher SIR have better
capabilities for receiving confidential information. Specifically,
when LNIS is employed, the network interference at each
legitimate receiver can be reduced, for example, by narrowing
the angle from which the radio signals are received or by
narrowing the transmission antenna pattern via beamforming.
Consider first the LNIS strategy where the legitimate re-
ceivers employ antennas with aperture angles radians, in
which case the effective density of interferers affecting the
legitimate receivers is
(59)
Such strategy also affects the density of the legitimate receivers
capable of listening the confidential information, whose effec-
tive density is given by
(60a)
or
(60b)
depending on whether the legitimate receivers have or do not
have the knowledge of legitimate transmitter positions.
Consider next the LNIS strategy where legitimate transmit-
ters employ antennas with aperture angle radians, in which
case the effective density of the eavesdroppers capable of in-
tercepting the confidential information is
(61)
Such strategy also affects the densities of nodes interfering the
legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers, whose effective
densities and are given by
(62)
(63)
25Various localization techniques can be employed for determining the posi-
tions of nodes in the network [77]–[84].
Now, consider the LNIS strategy where both the legitimate
transmitters and receivers employ antennas with aperture angles
and , respectively, in which case the effective density
of interferers affecting the legitimate receivers is
(64)
Replacing , , , and with , , , and , de-
pending on the specific LNIS strategy, and using the results
in Section V, the network secrecy rate density (20), the net-
work secrecy rate outage density (24), and the network secrecy
throughput density (33) are obtained for the LNIS strategy.
D. Asymmetric Network Interference Generation
The asymmetric network interference generation (ANIG)
strategy aims to control the amount of network interference
injected into the legitimate network and the eavesdropping net-
works. This strategy is based on the observation that intrinsic
secrecy can be enhanced by increasing the SIR at the legitimate
receivers or decreasing those at the eavesdroppers. This can
be accomplished, for example, by nulling the emission in the
direction of unintended legitimate receivers via beamforming.
Consider a legitimate network with a fraction of
legitimate transmitters having emission nulling capabilities. In
this case, the effective density of interferers affecting the
legitimate receivers is
(65)
Replacing with , and using the results in Section V,
the network secrecy rate density (20), the network secrecy rate
outage density (24), and the network secrecy throughput den-
sity (33) are obtained for the ANIG strategy.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents the secrecy performance of a large
wireless network. In particular, the impact of the destination
selection, propagation environment, network configuration,
and various competitive strategies on network secrecy are
quantified.26
A. Destinations Selection
Fig. 3 shows the network secrecy rate density in
cib/s/Hz/m as a function of when the th closest receivers
are selected in the legitimate network for different values of
. It can be observed that decreases significantly as
increases. This behavior can be attributed to the fact that the
network secrecy rate is limited by the capacity of legitimate
links, which decreases as the distance between legitimate trans-
mitters and receivers increases. It can also be observed that an
optimal value of maximizing exists. This is due to the
fact that the network interference affects both legitimate and
eavesdropping networks, therefore it can be either beneficial or
26In the following, consider a two-dimensional network and (unless otherwise
stated) Rayleigh fading, infinite and , and m. Although the
analysis of the network secrecy metrics accounts for the presence of intentional
interfering nodes, consider (unless otherwise stated) as a worst case
for network secrecy.
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Fig. 3. Network secrecy rate density as a function of when the th closest
legitimate receivers are selected for , node/m , and
. Lines represent analytical results. Black crosses and triangles represent the
Monte Carlo simulations done for the case when interferer distances depend on
the placement of the transmitters and for the case when interferer distances are
generated independently, respectively.
Fig. 4. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of when the closest
legitimate receivers are selected (diamonds) and when the receivers
with highest SIR are selected (circles) for , ,
cib/s/Hz , and node/m .
harmful for network secrecy. Fig. 3 also shows results obtained
by two levels of Monte Carlo simulations. Low-level simula-
tion results (black cross markers) are obtained by generating
node positions of the legitimate and eavesdropping networks
according to the PPPs, accounting for possible spatial correla-
tion of the network interference. High-level simulation results
(black triangle markers) are obtained by assuming independent
network interference. In addition to agreeing with the analytical
results, these simulation results confirm that the independence
assumption for network interference is sufficient for evaluating
network secrecy metrics in large wireless networks.
Fig. 4 shows the network secrecy throughput density in
cib/s/Hz/m as a function of for different values of when
the receivers closest to the transmitters or those with the max-
imum SIR are selected. It can be observed that increases
with . It can also be observed that an optimal value of
maximizing exists. This again is due to the fact that the
Fig. 5. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of when the closest
legitimate receivers are selected for , cib/s/Hz ,
node/m , node/m , different values of , and different values of
.
network interference affects both legitimate and eavesdropping
networks. Note that the selection based on the maximum SIR
provides better performance. This behavior is noticeable partic-
ularly for large , while for small , the legitimate receiver
with maximum SIR is often the one closest to the legitimate
transmitter.
B. Propagation Environment and Network Configuration
Fig. 5 shows the network secrecy throughput density as a
function of , when the closest legitimate receivers are selected
as a destination, for different values of fading severity parameter
and amplitude-loss coefficient . It can be observed that is
insensitive to variations in , whereas it is affected more signif-
icantly by . This behavior is due to the fact that significantly
affects the average received power of the useful and interfering
signals in the network. It can also be observed that the optimal
value of shifts toward higher values as increases.
Fig. 6(a) and (b), respectively, shows the contours of network
secrecy throughput density as a function of and , when
the closest legitimate receivers are selected, for and
0.5 node/m . It can be observed that scales with .27 It can
also be seen that the maximum throughput density region shifts
toward lower and higher for a lower value of . These
results show that for a lower legitimate node density, a higher
fraction of transmitters among the legitimate nodes is preferable
for enhancing the network secrecy. Note that this observation is
consistent with that of Fig. 4.
Fig. 7 shows the network secrecy throughput density as
a function of for different values of when the closest le-
gitimate receivers are selected. As expected, decreases as
the density of eavesdroppers increases. It can also be observed
that the optimal shifts toward higher values as increases.
This behavior can be attributed to the fact that, for a higher , a
larger amount of network interference is needed to mitigate the
eavesdropper capabilities.
Fig. 8 shows the network secrecy throughput density
as a function of (i.e., the ratio between densities of
27Note that, for a fixed , a higher density of legitimate receivers corresponds
to a lower average link distance.
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Fig. 6. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of and when the closest legitimate receivers are selected for , , node/m ,
and or 0.5 node/m . (a) node/m . (b) node/m
Fig. 7. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of when the closest
legitimate receivers are selected for , , cib/s/Hz ,
node/m , and different values of .
intentional interferers and legitimate nodes) for different values
of when the closest legitimate receivers are selected. It can
be observed that increases as increases, showing
the benefits of intentional interference on network secrecy.
This behavior can be attributed to the fact that intentional
interference mitigates the eavesdropping capabilities. It can
also be observed that approaches the asymptotic values,
corresponding to the absence of eavesdroppers. Note that the
asymptotic value of depends on according to the number
of legitimate links and the amount of network interference.
Note also that the asymptotic values are reached by lower
values of for lower .
C. Competitive Strategies for Network Secrecy
Fig. 9 shows the network secrecy throughput density
as a function of for different values of when NERN is
employed (note that corresponds to the absence of
NERN). It can be observed that increases with and
approaches the asymptotic values corresponding to the absence
of eavesdroppers. This behavior can be attributed to the fact
Fig. 8. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of when the
closest legitimate receivers are selected, intentional interferers are active, ,
, node/m , cib/s/Hz , and (continuous
lines) or node/m (dashed lines).
that a higher corresponds to the neutralization of a larger
number of nearby eavesdroppers, therefore improving the
network secrecy. Note that the asymptotic values are consistent
with those of Fig. 8 as expected.
Fig. 10 shows the network secrecy throughput density as
a function of antenna aperture angles for different values of
and when ENIS and LNIS are employed. It can be observed
that LNIS can successfully counteract ENIS. In fact, note that
when nodes have the same beamforming capability
, the increases as decreases.
Fig. 11 shows the network secrecy throughput density
as a function of for different values of when ENIS and
ANIG strategies are employed by eavesdropping and legitimate
networks, respectively. It can be observed that ANIG can in-
crease the network secrecy by increasing (note that
corresponds to the absence of ANIG). However, by comparing
Fig. 10 to Fig. 11, one can observe that LNIS is more effective
than ANIG in enhancing the network secrecy when ENIS is em-
ployed by the eavesdropping network.
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Fig. 9. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of when the
closest legitimate receivers are selected in the presence of NERN for ,
, cib/s/Hz , node/m , and node/m .
Fig. 10. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of
when the closest legitimate receivers are selected in the presence of ENIS
and LNIS for , , node/m , cib/s/Hz , and
(continuous lines) or node/m (dashed lines).
VIII. FINAL REMARK
A framework for design and analysis of wireless networks
with intrinsic secrecy has been developed. In particular, the con-
cept of network secrecy and new metrics for its evaluation have
been introduced. To quantify these metrics, the received SIR
in the legitimate network and in the eavesdropping network are
characterized. This paper offers a new perspective on the role of
node spatial distribution, wireless propagation medium, and ag-
gregate network interference on network secrecy. Specifically,
the analysis yields insights into the essence of network intrinsic
secrecy and provides guidelines for devising competitive strate-
gies that exploit properties inherent in wireless networks. Re-
garding the propagation medium, our results reveal that the ef-
fects of path loss dominate those of fading. It is shown that net-
work interference can provide significant benefits to network
secrecy. This work enables a deeper understanding of how in-
trinsic properties of wireless networks can be exploited to en-
hance the network secrecy, paving the way to more secure and
safer communications in the information society.
Fig. 11. Network secrecy throughput density as a function of when the closest
legitimate receivers are selected in the presence of ENIS with
and ANIG for , , node/m , cib/s/Hz , and
(continuous lines) or node/m (dashed lines).
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (20)
Since a generic homogeneous PPP is stationary, for any
property , for all [69].
To account for the confidential information generated from a
bounded set , the origin of the reference system can
be shifted to the position of the th node in . Let
and , (17)
can be rewritten as
(66)
If as for a convex averaging
sequence with , then (19) can be
written as
where is the number of points from contained in
. From [69, Proposition 1.23] and recalling that, for bounded
real functions, the limit of a product is the product of the limits,
we obtain
(67)
provided that . This results in (20).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (41)
For each , the CF of can be written as
(68)
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where is a Stable distributed RV according to (8), with
CF given by
(69)
Since the squared distance is an Erlang distributed
RV [85]–[87] with CF given by
(70)
we obtain as in (41).
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF (42)
To characterize the maximum SIR among nodes with index
in , consider with cardinality . The CDF of
conditioned on is given by28
.
By taking the expectation of over , we ob-
tain (42).
APPENDIX D
DERIVATION OF (48)
For Nakagami- fading channels, the conditional CDF of
is given by
(71)
By taking the expectation over , the CDF of
conditioned on results in
(72)
where is the Laplace transformation of ,
which is given by
(73)
The expectation over provides the CDF of as
given in (48).
28We consider the SIR equal to zero for the case of .
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